The Competitive Position of Hub Airports in the Transatlantic Market by Burghouwt, Guillaume & Veldhuis, Jan
Journal of Air Transportation  Vol. 11, No. 1 -2006 
  
 
 
THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF HUB 
AIRPORTS IN THE TRANSATLANTIC MARKET 
 
Guillaume Burghouwt 
SEO Economic Research 
 
Jan Veldhuis 
SEO Economic Research 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article puts forward the argument that the measurement of connectivity in hub-
and-spoke networks has to take into account the quality and quantity of both direct 
and indirect connections. The NETSCAN model, which has been applied in this 
study, quantifies indirect connectivity and scales it into a theoretical direct 
connection. NETSCAN allows researchers, airports, airlines, alliances and airport 
regions to analyse their competitive position in an integrated way. Using 
NETSCAN, the authors analysed the developments on the market between 
northwest Europe and the United States (US) between May 2003 and May 2005. 
One of the most striking developments has certainly been the impact of the Air 
France-KLM merger and the effects of the integration of KLM and Northwest into 
the SkyTeam alliance on the connectivity of Amsterdam Schiphol. Direct as well as 
indirect connectivity (via European and North American hubs) from Amsterdam to 
the US increased substantially. The main reason for this increase is the integration 
of the former Wings and SkyTeam networks via the respective hub airports. 
Moreover, the extended SkyTeam alliance raised frequencies between Amsterdam 
and the SkyTeam hubs (Atlanta, Houston, for example), opened new routes 
(Cincinnati) and boosted the network between Amsterdam and France. As a result 
of the new routes and frequencies, Amsterdam took over Heathrow’s position as the 
third best-connected northwest European airport to the US.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Hub-and-spoke networks have been an essential feature of the 
operations of air carriers since the deregulation of the domestic American air 
transport market in 1978. Hub-and-spoke networks allow the hub airline to 
maximize the number of connected city pairs given a certain number of 
flights. Due to the consolidation of different origin-destination combinations 
on a limited number of routes, the hub airline may benefit from higher load 
factors, higher frequencies and the use of larger aircraft with lower unit costs 
(Dennis, 1994a, 1994b). 
In a hub-and-spoke network, the carrier concentrates its network both 
spatially and temporally (Reynolds-Feighan, 2001). From a spatial point of 
view, the carrier organizes its network around one or a few central hub 
airports. At the hub, passengers transfer to their connecting flight. From a 
temporal perspective, the flight schedule at the hub is organised in a number 
of daily waves of incoming and outgoing flights, in which ideally all 
incoming flights connect to all outgoing flights (Bootsma, 1997). The wave 
system restricts the loss of passenger demand due to the additional transfer 
time of an indirect connection compared to a direct connection. 
Also in Europe, the hub-and-spoke network has gained ground since the 
liberalisation of the internal European Union (EU) market (1988-1997). 
Already before the liberalisation of the EU market, the national airlines 
operated star-shaped networks, spatially concentrated around the national 
home bases. Yet, most of these carriers could not be characterised as hub-
and-spoke airlines. The star-shaped networks were merely the result of the 
system of bilateral air service agreements that pinned down the designated 
carriers on their national home bases. Since the liberalisation of the market, 
many national and a few regional airlines built up their hub-and-spoke 
network by means of the intensification and adoption of wave systems 
(Burghouwt, 2005). However, since 2001 a shakeout on the hub market has 
taken place. Some hubs were torn down or rationalized by their home based 
carriers. British Airways dehubbed London Gatwick because the split-hub 
operation at Heathrow and Gatwick was not profitable. Iberia cancelled its 
hub operations at Miami because security measures at the airport had been 
tightened due to the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and connecting 
times had doubled. Air France rationalized the hub operation at Clermont-
Ferrand after the take-over of Regional Airlines in 2000. The hub operation 
at Clermont-Ferrand (the former hub of Regional Airlines) duplicated 
substantially the hub operation of Air France at Lyon. Other hubs 
disappeared or were scaled down because of the bankruptcies of the hub 
carriers (Sabena at Brussels, Swissair and Zurich, Air Littoral at Nice, 
Crossair at Basle). 
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Global airline alliances are increasingly important for the future of hubs. 
The three global airline alliances (OneWorld, Star and SkyTeam) choose one 
or two hubs at each continent to function as primary intercontinental 
gateways. Other hubs fulfil secondary, regionally oriented roles (Dennis, 
2005). 
The growth of hub-and-spoke operations has changed the competition 
between airlines in a structural way. The competitive position of airlines and 
airports is usually expressed in terms of top ten lists. Airlines and airports are 
compared with respect to total passenger enplanements, number of aircraft 
movements or tonnes of freight. Although such indicators are valuable in 
itself, they do not give any information on the competitive position of airline 
networks and hub airports.  
The gap in such analyses is the fact that, because of the rise of hub-and-
spoke systems, competition between airlines takes place in both a direct and 
indirect way. On the one hand, airlines compete on direct routes (from A to 
B). On the other had, they compete indirectly with a transfer at a hub (from 
A to B via H). The passenger’s choice for a certain route alternative will 
depend, among other things, on the ticket price and network quality. 
Especially in case of the availability of a direct route alternative, ticket price 
will be an important tool for an airline offering an indirect connection to 
compensate for lower network quality. Network quality is defined here as the 
frequency and associated travel times of a certain connection. 
This paper discusses the competitive position between airports, airlines, 
alliances and their hubs on the market between northwest Europe and the 
US. The analysis is restricted to network quality. Reliable price data are 
scarce and, if available, hard to use because of the large number of quickly 
changing ticket prices on a single flight. 
The paper is outlined as follows. The next section places this study in 
the context of earlier research on hub-and-spoke networks. The third 
section discusses the principles of hub-and-spoke systems in relation to 
network quality and connectivity. The fourth section deals with the 
NETSCAN model. The fifth and sixth sections discuss the empirical results 
of the research. The final section presents the conclusions of the research.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The rise of hub-and-spoke networks has been the subject of many 
academic studies. One branch of research deals with the advantages of hub-
and-spoke networks in terms of economies of density and scope (Braeutigam 
1999; Brueckner & Spiller, 1994; Caves, Christensen & Tretheway, 1984; 
Wojahn 2001), hub premiums, (Berry, Carnall & Spiller, 1996; Borenstein 
1989; Leijsen, Rietveld & Nijkamp, 2000; Oum, Zhang & Zhang, 1995), 
entry deterrence (Zhang 1996) and the role of hub-and-spoke networks in 
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airline alliances (Dresner & Windle, 1995; Oum, Park & Zhang, 2000; Pels, 
2001). A second branch of research aims to optimize hub-and-spoke 
networks spatially by means of hub location-allocation models (Kuby & 
Gray 1993; O’Kelly & Miller, 1994; O’Kelly, 1998; O’Kelly & Bryan, 
1998). 
Another branch of research has studied the structure, performance and 
growth of hub-and-spoke networks from an empirical point of view. Most 
studies focus on the spatial dimension of hub-and-spoke networks: the level 
to which an airline has concentrated its network on a few key nodes in the 
network (Bania, Bauer & Zlatoper, 1998; Burghouwt, Hakfoort & Ritsema-
Van Eck, 2003; Ivy, 1993; Shaw, 1993; Reynolds-Feighan, 2001; Wojahn, 
2001). However, Bootsma (1997), Burghouwt (2005), Burghouwt and de 
Wit (2005); Dennis (1994a, 1994b), Reynolds-Feighan (2001) and Wojahn 
(2001) explicitly underline the temporal dimension or schedule structure as 
an essential element for the empirical study of the structure, performance and 
development of hub-and-spoke networks. Hub-and-spoke airlines offer 
consumers both direct and indirect travel opportunities (via their hub). To 
maximize indirect travel opportunities and to minimize passenger loss due to 
transfer time and detour time indirect travel opportunities need efficient 
schedule coordination in terms of a well developed wave system structure at 
the hub. 
However, schedule coordination and the resulting hub performance are 
not captured by the traditional graph theoretical or spatial concentration 
measures. Only a few authors have included the level of schedule 
coordination in the measurement of the performance and structure of hub-
and-spoke networks (for example, Bootsma, 1997; Burghouwt, 2005; 
Dennis, 1994b; Veldhuis, 1997). These studies include the possibility of 
making transfers from one flight to another, taking into account minimum 
and maximum connecting times and the quality of those connections. In 
this study, the NETSCAN model, developed by Veldhuis (1997) and 
owned by SEO Economic Research, has been applied to measure the 
performance of airline networks in the transatlantic market.  
NETWORK QUALITY, HUB-AND-SPOKE SYSTEMS AND 
CONNECTIVITY 
The extent to which airlines can play a role in the market between A and 
B depends on a number of factors. First, the size of the market is important. 
If the size of the origin-destination market is larger than a certain critical 
threshold, an airline may decide to serve that market directly. The critical 
threshold will also depend on the critical load factor, the size of the smallest 
airplane that can be operated on the route and the minimum desired weekly 
frequency. If the market size is below this threshold, the market can only be 
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served indirectly. However, this does not mean that, if a direct travel 
opportunity is available all passengers will choose the direct travel 
alternative. In reality, traffic will be spread over direct and indirect travel 
opportunities, depending on ticket prices and the network quality of the 
indirect connection.  
The quality of an indirect connection between A and B with a transfer at 
hub H is not equal to the quality of a direct connection between A and B. In 
other words, the passenger travelling indirectly will experience additional 
costs due to longer travel times, consisting of detour time and transfer time. 
The transfer time equals at least the minimum connecting time, or the 
minimum time needed to transfer between two flights at hub H.  
Hence, the extent to which an airline is able to serve successfully an 
indirect market is, besides prices, mainly dependent on two things. First, the 
geographical location of the respective hub in relation to the main 
continental and intercontinental traffic flows. Second, the efficiency of the 
airline’s schedule is crucial. If a carrier is able to coordinate its incoming and 
outgoing flights effectively so that all incoming flights connect to all 
outgoing flights, the quality loss of an indirect connection can be kept to a 
minimum. 
Against the background of hub-and-spoke networks, this article 
distinguishes three types of connections: 
1. Direct connections: flights between A and B without a hub transfer 
(e.g., from Amsterdam to Los Angeles) 
2. Indirect connections: flights from A to B, but with a transfer at hub X 
(e.g., from Amsterdam to Los Angeles via Detroit) 
 
Hub connections: connections via (with a transfer at) hub A between 
origin C and destination B (e.g., from Hamburg via Amsterdam to Los 
Angeles). 
In fact, hub connections are equal to indirect connections. However, 
indirect connectivity is measured from the perspective of the originating 
airport and hub connectivity is measured from the perspective of the hub 
airport. The measurement of indirect connectivity is particularly important 
from the perspective of consumer welfare (e.g., how many direct and indirect 
connections are available to consumers between Amsterdam and Los 
Angeles). The concept of hub connectivity is particularly important for 
measuring the competitive position of airline hubs in a certain market (e.g., 
how does Amsterdam perform as a hub in the market between Hamburg and 
Los Angeles). 
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METHOD AND DATA 
The NETSCAN model 
As the authors argued earlier, the quality of an indirect connection is not 
equal to the quality of a direct connection. The NETSCAN model quantifies 
the quality of an indirect connection and scales it to the quality of a 
theoretical direct connection. The authors discuss briefly the methodology of 
the NETSCAN model in general terms. For a detailed discussion, refer to 
Veldhuis (1997) and IATA (2000). 
NETSCAN assigns a quality index to every connection, ranging 
between 0 and 1. A direct, non-stop flight is given the maximum quality 
index of 1. The quality index of an indirect connection will always be lower 
than 1 since extra travel time is added due to transfer time and detour time of 
the flight. The same holds true for a direct multi-stop connection: passenger 
face a lower network quality because of en-route stops compared to a non-
stop direct connection. 
If the additional travel time of an indirect connection exceeds a certain 
threshold, the quality index of the connection equals 0. The threshold of a 
certain indirect connection between two airports depends on the travel time 
of a theoretical direct connection between these two airports. In other words, 
the longer the theoretical direct travel time between two airports, the longer 
the maximum indirect travel time can be. For example, a maximum indirect 
travel time of three hours belongs to a direct flight of one hour, while the 
maximum indirect travel time of a 12-hour flight equals 24 hours. The travel 
time of a theoretical direct connection is determined by the geographical 
coordinates of origin and destination airport and assumptions on flight speed 
and time needed for take-off and landing. By taking the product of the 
quality index and the frequency of the connection per time unit (day, week, 
and year), the total number of connections or connectivity units (CNUs), can 
be derived.  Summarizing the following model has been applied for each 
individual (direct, indirect or hub) connection:  
MAXT = (3 - 0.075 * NST) * NST  (1) 
PTT =  FLY + (3 * TRF)   (2) 
QUAL = 1 – ((PTT - NST)/(MAXT - NST)) (3) 
CNU = QUAL * FREQ   (4) 
Where MAXT is the maximum perceived travel time, NST is the non-stop 
travel time, PTT is the perceived travel time, FLY is the flying time, TRF 
is the transfer time, QUAL is the quality index of an individual 
connection and CNU is the number of connectivity units. 
Table 1 illustrates the NETSCAN model. Consider the example of the 
connectivity between Amsterdam and Cincinnati. The SkyTeam alliance 
operates a daily direct connection to Cincinnati in May 2005. The direct 
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flight has a quality index of 1 since no transfer time or detour time is 
involved. Hence, the number of CNUs per week equals the frequency per 
week. Besides a direct connection, SkyTeam, and to a lesser extent the Star 
alliance, offers indirect connections via other American and European hubs. 
In this respect, Detroit is the most important hub. In theory, the number of 
viable connections (quality index > 0) via Detroit is 89 per week. However, 
as a result of transfer time and detour time, the average quality index equals 
0,32. This results in a total number of weighted CNUs of 28,7. Because 
NETSCAN scales the indirect connection to a theoretical direct connection, 
the CNUs via Detroit can be read as follows: between Amsterdam and 
Cincinnati 89 indirect flights per week are offered by SkyTeam via Detroit. 
These 89 flights are comparable to 28,7 direct flights from Amsterdam to 
Cincinnati. 
Table 1. Quality indices, frequency per week and connectivity units (CNU’s), Amsterdam-
Cincinnati, 3rd week of May 2005 
 
Origin Hub Destination Alliance 
Average 
Quality 
Index 
Frequency 
per Week CNU/week 
Amsterdam -- Cincinnati SkyTeam 1,00 7 7,0 
Amsterdam Atlanta Cincinnati SkyTeam 0,42 14 5,9 
 Boston  SkyTeam 0,49 7 3,4 
 Paris CDG  SkyTeam 0,35 47 16,6 
 Detroit  SkyTeam 0,32 89 28,7 
 New York Newark  SkyTeam 0,40 46 18,2 
 Rome FCO  SkyTeam 0,38 7 2,6 
 Frankfurt  SkyTeam 0,47 7 3,3 
 Washington Dulles  SkyTeam 0,46 14 6,4 
 Houston  SkyTeam 0,35 7 2,4 
 New York JFK  SkyTeam 0,37 28 10,5 
 Memphis  SkyTeam 0,19 7 1,4 
 Minneapolis  SkyTeam 0,30 41 12,1 
 Chicago O’Hare  SkyTeam 0,39 14 5,4 
   Star 0,31 7 2,2 
 Philadelphia  Star 0,30 6 1,8 
 Montreal Dorval  SkyTeam 0,58 7 4,1 
 Toronto  SkyTeam 0,41 6 2,5 
TOTAL    0,37 361,00 134,50 
Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
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Data and classifications 
The authors used OAG flight schedules in the third week of May in 
2003, 2004 and 2005 (OAG 2005). Direct connections are directly available 
from the OAG database. Indirect connections have been constructed using an 
algorithm, which identifies for each incoming flight at an airport the number 
of outgoing flights that connect to it. The algorithm takes into account 
minimum connection times and puts a limit on the maximum connecting 
time and routing factor. Next, the NETSCAN model assigns to each direct 
and indirect connection a quality index, ranging between 0 and 1. 
Within the NETSCAN model, only online connections are considered as 
viable connections. In other words, the transfer between two flights has to 
take place between flights of the same airline or global airline alliance. For 
the years 2004 and 2005, we distinguish three global airline alliances: 
OneWorld, SkyTeam and Star. For the year 2003, the authors distinguish an 
additional alliance, Wings (KLM/Northwest), which submerged into 
SkyTeam in 2004. 
The analysis considers the connectivity between airports in northwest 
Europe and airports in the US. Northwest Europe is defined as Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxemburg (Benelux), the UK, Ireland, France and 
Germany. Only westbound connections (from northwest Europe to the US) 
have been taken into account. The return connections have not been 
considered in the analysis. It is important to note that the total market 
between northwest Europe and the US has been analysed. This means that 
indirect connections in this market can be provided by hubs within the 
geographical boundaries of this market (Amsterdam and Frankfurt, for 
example) but also by hubs located outside the geographical boundaries of 
this market (Madrid, for example).  
Furthermore, we make a distinction between primary, secondary and 
tertiary airports. European primary airports are the four largest airports: 
London Heathrow, Paris CDG, Frankfurt and Amsterdam. The American 
primary airports are the major gateways: Chicago O’Hare, Atlanta, Los 
Angeles and New York JFK. Secondary airports are all those airports having 
a direct connection from northwest Europe to the US in May 2005 (Munich, 
Minneapolis, for example). Tertiary airports are all other airports. 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT CONNECTIVITY 
Recovery and stabilisation 
The total number of direct flights between northwest Europe and the US 
increased about 21 percent between May 2003 and May 2005 (Table 2). For 
a large part, this growth took place between 2003 and 2004 (+17%). This 
period can be considered as a recovering period from the downturn after 9/11 
and the economic recession. The period between 2004 and 2005 
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demonstrates lower growth rates (+4%), which is much closer to the long-
term growth rates in international air transport. The same holds true for 
indirect connectivity (with a transfer at a hub). The number of indirect 
connections increased at a higher rate between 2003 and 2005 (+41%) than  
direct connectivity. 
The highest growth percentages can be found at the only primary airport 
in the Benelux (Schiphol), both with respect to direct and indirect 
connectivity. The authors later show that this has been largely the 
consequence of the integration of KLM into the SkyTeam alliance after the 
Air France-KLM merger. The primary airport of the UK and Ireland region 
(London Heathrow) experienced modest growth levels in terms of the 
number of direct frequencies. This is partly the result of the capacity 
shortages at the airport. The crisis in the global air transport sector and the 
orientation of Heathrow towards North America had eased the capacity 
shortages at the airport. Not surprisingly, the number of flights increased 
between 2003 and 2004. Between 2004 and 2005, the growth percentages 
were again reduced to zero. No more flights could be accommodated at the 
airport. The growth in the number of indirect connections was mainly due to 
better/more connections via other hubs to the US. 
In addition, Table 2 demonstrates the demand threshold, which airlines 
need in order to serve transatlantic routes. Only between primary/secondary 
European airports on the one hand and primary/secondary American airports 
on the other, demand levels are sufficiently large to justify direct 
connections. Tertiary European airports depend on European hub airports for 
their connections to the US. 
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Changing connectivity levels of European Airports 
To what extent did the position of individual European airports change 
with respect direct and indirect connectivity levels? Figure 1 shows some 
remarkable changes between 2003 and 2005. 
First, the primary and secondary airports show a recovery of the industry 
crisis between 2003 and 2004 (see also the previous section). Yet, at most of 
the European airports, growth rates were considerably lower between 2004 
and 2005. Some airports even demonstrated negative growth rates, such as 
Munich, Manchester and Düsseldorf. 
  CNU % growth 
  2003 2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2003-2005 
Initial 
origin 
Type of 
origin Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 
Benelux 
primary 
(AMS) 185 2790 14 78 8 17 24 109 
 secondary 43 1296 10 10 1 6 11 17 
 tertiary . 150  39  28  78 
UK and 
Ireland 
primary 
(LHR) 501 3698 14 37 0 1 14 38 
 secondary 354 7245 17 30 9 10 28 43 
 tertiary . 605  21  8  30 
France 
primary 
(CDG) 257 4662 18 30 3 5 22 36 
 secondary 9 1324 -19 12 0 16 -19 29 
 tertiary . 501  10  19  31 
Germany
primary 
(FRA) 267 5144 18 28 1 3 20 32 
 secondary 81 4819 36 33 7 -1 46 31 
 tertiary . 1355  7  12  19 
Total  1696 33590 17 32 4 7 21 41 
Table 2. Direct and indirect connectivity units (CNU) from primary, secondary 
and tertiary airports in northwest Europe to the US, 2003-20051 
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Figure 1. Total connectivity (direct + indirect) from primary and secondary NW-
European airports, 2003-2005 
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Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
Secondly, Amsterdam Schiphol is an exception to the more modest 
growth rates in the 2004-2005 period. How can we understand the continued 
growth at Schiphol? The explanation for this observation can be found in the 
Air France-KLM merger and the entry of KLM to the SkyTeam alliance. In 
2003, KLM was still part of the Wings alliance (KLM/Northwest). Indirect 
connections to the US were primarily generated by the Wings alliance via 
the Northwest hubs in the US (Detroit, Minneapolis and Memphis) and to a 
lesser extent by other alliances. Our NETSCAN model did not consider 
connections between, for example, KLM and Delta as viable connections 
since both carriers did not belong to the same alliance in 2003. 
The entry of Northwest and KLM to the SkyTeam alliance resulted in an 
integration of the Wings and SkyTeam networks. From 2004 on, the 
NETSCAN model considers the connections between, for example, the 
KLM and Delta flights at Schiphol, as online, viable connections. As Figure 
2a illustrates for Amsterdam, the impact of the network integration between 
2003 and 2004 is substantial. A good example is Houston. In 2003, the KLM 
flights to Houston did not connect to the domestic flights of Continental. 
From 2004 on (due to the Air France-KLM merger and the integration of 
KLM into SkyTeam) the NETSCAN model considers these connections as 
online and thus viable connections. As a result, the number of connections 
from Amsterdam via Houston to the rest of the US increased substantially. 
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In addition, new services and frequencies between the US and 
Amsterdam were added against the background of the SkyTeam extension 
and the Air France-KLM merger. Delta Airlines, for example, started to 
operate a daily frequency between its Cincinnati hub and the new SkyTeam 
hub in Amsterdam during the period 2003 and 2004. The same holds true for 
the growth in frequencies between Amsterdam and Atlanta in 2005. KLM 
started a daily frequency to Atlanta in 2005, which brought the total 
SkyTeam frequency to a twice-daily level. Figure 2b shows that, as a result 
of the additional daily frequency, the indirect connectivity between 
Amsterdam and the US via Atlanta was boosted. 
Figure 2a. Absolute growth of indirect connectivity (CNU) from Amsterdam via North-
American and European hubs to the US, 2003-2004 
 
 
Figure 2b. Absolute growth of indirect connectivity (CNU) from Amsterdam via North-
American and European hubs to the US, 2004-2005 
 
Source: OAG (2005); own calculations
Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
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Finally, London Heathrow lost its third position to Amsterdam in the 
ranking of best-connected airports to the US (Figure 1). Whereas Amsterdam 
benefited from the integration of KLM into the Air France and SkyTeam 
network, Heathrow suffered from its capacity limitations. The capacity 
problems at Heathrow make it extremely difficult for the OneWorld and 
other alliances to increase frequencies or add new routes. 
HUB CONNECTIVITY 
The dominance of American hubs 
Until now, we have only considered direct and indirect connectivity. 
These measures give a good indication of the direct and indirect service 
levels available at the respective airports to the consumers. However, they do 
not measure the competitive position of an airport in the connecting market. 
Hence, we have analysed the hub connectivity of airports in the transatlantic 
market. 
Figure 3a. Hub connectivity on the market between NW-Europe and the US per hub in 
2005, North-American hubs 
 
 Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
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Figure 3b. Hub connectivity on the market between NW-Europe and the USA per hub in 
2005, European hubs  
 
Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
 
With regard to hub connectivity on the market between northwest 
Europe and the US, American airports have a dominant position (Figures 3a 
& b). Moreover, they have further strengthened their position between 2003 
and 2005. In 2003, almost 65% of the hub connections were generated at 
American airports. In 2005, this percentage had increased to 69%. The share 
of northwest European airports in total hub connectivity decreased from 30% 
in 2003 to 27% in 2005. The dominance of American hubs is largely the 
consequence of the difference in market size between the US and northwest 
Europe. The number of tertiary airports in the US is much higher than the 
number of tertiary airports in northwest Europe. Since tertiary American 
airports are only served by American hubs and not by European airports, the 
hub connectivity of American airports is essentially larger than the hub 
connectivity of northwest European airports. 
Chicago O’Hare and Atlanta can be considered as superhubs. The two 
hubs offered more hub connections than all northwest European hubs 
together. Both airports are the main home bases of large hub-and-spoke 
carriers and their alliance: Chicago for both American (OneWorld) and 
United (Star), Atlanta for Delta (SkyTeam). In addition to the superhubs, a 
group of second tier hubs can be identified, on both the European and 
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American side. In Europe, the primary airports London Heathrow, Frankfurt, 
Paris CDG and Amsterdam belong to this group of second tier airports. 
Further down the hierarchy, the only European airport that plays a 
substantial role in the connecting market is Lufthansa’s secondary hub 
Munich. Other airports have too little direct flights to the US or are too 
decentrally located in a geographical sense (such as Madrid or Milan 
Malpensa) to be competitive in the hub market. London Gatwick was an 
important hub to the US during the nineties, but lost its position after British 
Airways decided to dehub Gatwick (Burghouwt, 2005). 
On the American side, the number of second tier airports is larger. In 
particular, the airports that are a hub for SkyTeam are important second tier 
airports (Newark, Detroit, Cincinnati, and Houston). In addition, the Dallas 
DFW (OneWorld) and Washington Dulles and Philadelphia (Star) can be 
considered as second tier airports. The fact that the SkyTeam hubs seem to 
dominate the hub market is in line with the development of alliance market 
shares, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Changing alliance patterns 
The global airline alliances fully dominated the connecting market 
between northwest Europe and the US during the period of analysis. Only 
1% of the hub connectivity was generated by airlines not belonging to a 
global airline alliance. SkyTeam had the largest share in the number of hub 
connections (CNUs) in 2004 and 2005, followed by Star and OneWorld. In 
addition, the share of SkyTeam increased from 30% in 2003 to 46% in 2005, 
because of the integration of the Wings networks (KLM/Northwest) into 
SkyTeam. Because of the integration, Star lost its first position in the hub 
market to SkyTeam. Because of the synergy effects due to network 
integration, the share of SkyTeam in 2004 (44%) was substantially larger 
than the sum of the market shares of Wings (9%) and SkyTeam (30%) in 
2003. 
American hubs dominate the market in all alliances. Within SkyTeam, 
the share of American hubs was 73% in 2005. Within the networks of all of 
the alliances, the share of European hubs decreased and the share of 
American hubs increased. The same holds true for all other alliances. A 
small percentage of the hub connectivity of the alliances is generated at hubs 
outside northwest Europe or the US. Examples of such hubs are Madrid 
(Oneworld), Mexico (SkyTeam) and Toronto Lester (Star). 
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Table 3. Share of regions in total hub connectivity of alliance and share of alliance in total 
hub-connectivity, 2003-2005 
   2003 2004 2005 
% in total alliance ONEWORLD NW-Europe 34 30 31 
  US 57 62 62 
  Rest of the world 9 8 8 
% in grand total   23 21 20 
% in total alliance SKY TEAM NW-Europe 19 21 22 
  US 74 73 73 
  Rest of the world 7 6 5 
% in grand total   30 44 46 
% in total alliance STAR NW-Europe 30 27 28 
  US 59 64 63 
  Rest of the world 11 9 10 
% in grand total   36 34 33 
% in total alliance WINGS NW-Europe 34 -- -- 
  US 61 -- -- 
  Rest of the world 5 -- -- 
% in grand total   9 -- -- 
% in total alliance NON-ALLIANCE NW-Europe 0 0 0 
  US 0 0 0 
  Rest of the world 100 100 100 
% in grand total   1 1 1 
Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
 
Not surprisingly, the growth of European hubs has been on average 
lower than the growth of American hubs (Figure 4). In the US, Cincinnati, 
Houston, New York JFK, Minneapolis and Boston demonstrated high 
growth rates in particular. In Europe, only Amsterdam Schiphol experienced 
growth levels comparable to its American counterparts. In contrast to 
Frankfurt, Munich and Heathrow, this growth continued in between 2004 
and 2005. 
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Figure 4. Percent  growth in hub-connectivity, NW-Europe to US for selected airports,              
2003-2005 
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Developments within alliances 
As the authors showed earlier, growth at the SkyTeam hubs can be 
attributed largely to extension of the SkyTeam alliance and the growth of 
transatlantic frequencies to the European hubs Amsterdam Schiphol and 
Paris CDG. In addition, Air France-KLM increased feeder frequencies 
between Schiphol and the French hinterland. Paris CDG is more orientated 
towards France and Germany for attracting transfer passengers. There is a 
clear distinction in geographical market segmentation between the two hubs. 
Paris CDG’s feeder network in northwest Europe is primarily located in 
France, whereas the feeder network of Amsterdam is more focused on the 
UK and has in general less CNUs per feeder airport (Figure 5 and 
Appendix). 
   Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
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Figure 5 Connectivity units between NW-European regions and the US via selected 
European hubs, 2003-2005 
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Within the SkyTeam alliance, Minneapolis (Northwest) seems to start to 
play a less important role. Although the number of frequencies between 
European origins remained equal between 2004 and 2005, the hub 
connectivity of Minneapolis decreased because of fewer frequencies to the 
American domestic market. This conclusion is in line with the strategy of 
Northwest to convert Detroit into the primary intercontinental hub and to 
give Minneapolis a secondary, continental role. After the large-scale 
expansion of Detroit Metro, the airport is much better equipped to facilitate 
and the hub system of Northwest, which requires high peak-hour capacity 
and short connecting times. 
The Star alliance has two primary European hubs for the market 
between northwest Europe and the US: Frankfurt and Munich. The 
secondary hub of Star, Copenhagen, only plays a marginal role for the 
market under consideration. At Frankfurt, growth percentages were moderate 
due to severe capacity restrictions at the airport. In contrast to Amsterdam, 
Paris CDG and Heathrow, both hubs are largely orientated towards the large 
German domestic market for attracting feeder traffic (see Appendix). In 
2005, the percentage of hub connections with a German origin was 72% at 
Frankfurt and 74% at Munich. In comparison, for Amsterdam, the 
percentage of hub connections originating in Benelux was only 14%, for 
Paris CDG (French origins) 43% and for Heathrow (UK/Ireland origins) 
124 Journal of Air Transportation  
  
 
45% (see Appendix). Outside Germany, there are not many airports in 
northwest Europe used as feeder airports by Frankfurt and Munich. 
Finally, OneWorld has little opportunities to grow on the northern part 
of the transatlantic market as far as London Heathrow is concerned. 
Heathrow is capacity restricted while the Gatwick hub strategy did not prove 
to be a success at the end of the 1990s. As the Appendix shows, connectivity 
is mostly generated at the large British and European airports. On the 
American side, Chicago O’Hare saw its position as a hub decline to some 
extent between 2004 and 2005. Chicago is a dual hub of both American 
(OneWorld) and United (Star). Possibly, the implementation of the rolling 
hub concept by American may be the cause of the slightly declining hub 
position between 2004 and 2005. American depeaked its hub operation in 
order to ease congestion problems at the airport. Depeaking might have had 
a negative impact on connectivity levels at O’Hare. 
 
Some first evidence on concentration levels after the Air France/KLM 
merger 
Until now, the impact of the Air France-KLM merger and the 
integration of Wings into SkyTeam seem to have had only positive network 
impacts. But what about the impact of these developments on market 
concentration levels at the transatlantic market? The number of global airline 
alliances decreased from four to three. 
Although market concentration is somewhat outside the scope of the 
paper, the results of our model allow us to compute average market 
concentration levels in terms of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index1 (HHI) at 
the route level. Figure 6 shows the average HHI between 2003 and 2005 for 
a selection of European airports. The HHI was defined at the airport-pair 
level. Input for the HHI is the share of an alliance in the total number of 
direct and indirect connectivity units per airport pair. 
The Air France-KLM merger and the integration of Wings into 
SkyTeam have had a market concentration increasing impact. Both at 
Amsterdam and Paris CDG, concentration levels increased substantially. 
This conclusion holds for all route types, but is stronger for primary and 
secondary American destinations than for tertiary destinations. However, 
concentration levels at the (thin) tertiary destinations were already high in 
2003. In addition, the concentration increasing effects are larger for 
Amsterdam than for Paris CDG. At the same time, concentration levels at 
three other major northwest European airports remained virtually stable 
between 2003 and 2005. 
Increasing concentration levels generally allow airlines to set higher 
fares (see for example, Borenstein, 1992). Hence, evaluation of the consumer 
                                                 
1 Sum of squared market shares.  
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welfare impacts of the Air France-KLM will have to take into account both 
the positive impacts of the enlargement of the network scope as well as 
potential impacts on airfares. Yet, this issue is outside the scope of this paper 
and should be dealt with in future research. 
Figure 6. Average Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) per airport pair between selected 
European airports and primary, secondary and tertiary US destinations, 2003-2005 
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HHI tertiary American destinations
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  Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the authors argued that the measurement of network 
performance in hub-and-spoke systems should take into account the quantity 
and quality of both direct and indirect connections. The NETSCAN model 
quantifies the potential direct and indirect connectivity and scales the quality 
of these connections to the quality of a theoretical direct connection. As a 
result, direct and indirect connections (via hubs) are additive and can be 
compared. NETSCAN allows for an integrated analysis of the competitive 
position of airline/alliance networks, airports and regions. 
The authors applied NETSCAN to the network between northwest 
Europe and the US between 2003 and 2005. One of the most striking 
developments has certainly been the impact of the Air France-KLM merger 
on the competitive position of Amsterdam Schiphol and the SkyTeam 
alliance in general. Both the number of direct and indirect travel 
opportunities for the passengers travelling from and via Schiphol increased 
at a higher rate than at the neighbouring European hub airports. On the one 
hand, the integration of Wings into SkyTeam resulted in a substantial 
increase in connecting opportunities at the hubs of the extended SkyTeam 
alliance. On the other hand, frequencies between Amsterdam and the new 
SkyTeam hubs as well as French secondary airports were increased and new 
services were initiated.  
Yet, the paper has also demonstrated some first signs of the potential 
impact of the Air France-KLM merger and the integration of Wings into 
SkyTeam on concentration levels in the transatlantic market. In particular, at 
the routes between Amsterdam/Paris and the primary and secondary 
American destinations, average concentration levels increased substantially. 
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In contrast, concentration levels between some other large European airports 
and the US remained virtually unchanged. Increasing concentration levels 
might eventually result in higher airfares for consumers. The positive 
welfare effects of the Air France-KLM merger in terms of a large network 
scope will have to be evaluated against potential upward effects on fare 
levels. Yet, this issue will have to be addressed in future research. 
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APPENDIX  
Annex A Indirect connectivity (CNU per week) of Northwest-European airports via 
selected, major European airports, 2005 
 
 
 
 
Source: OAG (2005); own calculations 
